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GEOGRAPHIC PRICE RELATIONSHIPS UNDER 
FEDERAL MILK MARKETING ORDERS
Introduction
Following a period of contentious debate which pitted the Upper Midwest dairy industry 
against most of the rest of the dairy industry in the U.S. in 1990, die Secretary of Agriculture 
agreed to conduct a national hearing on major features of federal milk marketing orders. The 
1990 national hearing on federal milk marketing orders was held between Labor Day and 
Thanksgiving Day. More than 10,000 pages of testimony were taken from 195 witnesses who 
provided 233 exhibits during 43 days of hearings held in six locations across the eastern half of 
the U.S. Without a doubt the key issue listed by the Secretary in his invitation for proposals and 
in the hearing notice was the large and fundamental issue of “the appropriate class I differential 
for each order” (Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The summary to the Notice of 
Public Hearing on Proposed Rulemaking states that the proposals being considered “concern 
how class I milk prices are established...” among other items, and it identifies class I pricing as 
an issue of “particular significance.”
In this paper we review the historical basis for regional differences in class I milk prices and 
demonstrate that the shadow prices associated with the class I processing locations in a highly 
disaggregated spatial model of the U.S. dairy industry follow patterns somewhat similar to those 
observed under current regulation. The analysis reveals areas where class I milk may be under­
valued or overvalued under present regulations.
Organization
The paper is organized into four major parts, which are briefly outlined in this section.
First, we wish to review what we believe to be the underlying motivations for many of the 
proposals related to class I pricing. In other words, why was a hearing of such large dimensions 
called? Our purpose here is to show that the fundamental issues and motivating factors leading 
to most proposals stem primarily from three distinct concerns and that these concerns relate only 
in part to Federal Order policy, per se. These three concerns are Dairy Price Support Policy, 
where manufactured milk products are made, and attitudes toward deregulation.
Much of the criticism of present FMMO prices hinges on assertions that they have led to 
regionally distorted production incentives and excessive production in some regions. Thus, our 
second objective is to present statistical evidence on relationships between prices and marketings 
in federal order areas from 1985 to 1987.
Third, we will discuss the historical record to review the origin of regional price relationships 
and the philosophy that has evolved to guide FMMO pricing policy as it relates to class I differ­
entials. The objective is to illustrate that class I differentials evolved from historical patterns that 
reflected market conditions and an economics that predates administered pricing. We also stress 
the notion of a location value of milk that is distinct from cost of production and other such 
factors.
Fourth, we will introduce results of research using a mathematical model of dairy markets 
across the U.S. to measure what the appropriate geographic relationship between class I prices 
might be.
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Underlying Factors Leading to Proposals for Changing Class I Differentials
Dairy Price Support Program Issues
From 1975 to 1983 milk production increased 21% whereas commercial disappearance 
increased less than 8%. As a result, net removals under the Dairy Price Support Program (DPSP) 
rose from a modest 2.0 billion pounds to the record amount of 16.8 billion pounds (milk equiva­
lent). The net cost of the DPSP rose from $319 million in FY1975 to $2.6 billion in FY1983. 
These sorts of changes in dairy markets help illuminate why certain policy choices were made 
and illustrate the overall consequences of policy decisions. USDA data on national milk supply, 
utilization, and prices from 1980 to 1989 are provided in Table 1.
By 1980 or 1981 it was becoming quite clear that the surplus situation was serious and 
worsening; however it proved to be extremely difficult for Congress, the administration, and 
dairy industry members to find and agree on the appropriate solution.
Table 1. U.S. Supply and Utilization of Milk, 1980-1990
(Bil. Lbs.) 1980* 1981 1982 1983 1984* 1985 1986 1987 1988* 1989 1990
Production 128.4 132.8 135.5 139.6 135.4 143.0 143.1 142.7 145.2 144.3 1485
Farm Use 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 22
Marketings 126.1 130.5 133.1 137.2 132.5 140.6 140.7 140.4 143.0 142.1 146.3
Beg. C Stks 5.4 5.8 5.4 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.3 4.1
Imports 2.1 2 2 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4
Total Supply 133.6 138.5 141.0 144.4 140.4 148.3 148.0 147.1 150.0 148.9 152.8
Comm. Dis. 119.0 120.2 ' 122.1 122.4 126.9 130.5 133.2 135.8 136.8 135.8 140.7
End. Comm. Stks 5.8 5.4 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.4
Net Removals 8.8 12.9 14.3 16.8 8.6 13.2 10.6 6.7 8.9 9.0 7.7
Total Use 133.6 138.5 141.0 144.4 140.4 148.3 148.0 147.1 150.0 148.9 152.8
*leap year
U.S. Farm Prices
(S/cwt)_____________ 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988* 1989 1990
Support (3.5%) 12.04 12.82 12.80 12.76 1231 11.69 11.31 11.00 10.33 10.47 9.89
M-W (3.5%) 11.88 12.57 12.49 12.49 12.29 11.48 11.30 1133 11.03 12.37 12.16
All Milk (3.67%) 13.05 13.77 13.61 13.58 13.46 12.76 12.51 12.54 12.26 13.56 13.66
Assessment - - 0.40 0.48 0.50 0.13 0.36 0.19 0.03 - 0.01
Ration Value 7.42 8.02 7.45 7.88 8.16 7.35 7.00 6.81 7.75 8.22 8.10
Milk: Ration 1.76 1.72 1.83 1.72 1.65 1.74 1.79 1.84 1.58 1.65 1.69
Milk+Ass'cRation 1.76 1.72 1.77 1.66 1.59 1.72 1.74 1.81 1.58 1.65 1.69
Source: USDA, "Dairy Situation and Outlook," 1990 Estimated by A. Novakovic
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In April 1981, the semiannual adjustment of the support price to 80% of parity was re­
scinded, indicating that Congress had finally recognized that large, frequent price increases could 
not be justified. In the Agriculture and Food Act signed in December 1981, Congress severed 
the support price for milk from the parity standard but still required small increases in the sup­
port price. With the ink hardly dry on the 1981 farm bill, Congressional budget committees 
pushed through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982. This bill included language to 
freeze the support price at the level it had been since October 1980 and begin a new program of 
collecting assessments from dairy farmers to offset DPSP costs. The collecting of assessments 
was held up by court action, but in April 1983, the USDA began what it called the Dairy Collec­
tion Program.
The assessment program galvanized the dairy community and Congressional agriculture 
committees, and the policy imperative became one of doing anything but assessments. In 
November 1983 a four-point plan was adopted which contained each of the major proposals that 
had been proposed by various parties. The Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 (DPSA) 
combined price cuts, a mandatory assessment to cover DPSP costs, a mandatory promotion 
program funded by another fanner assessment, and a Milk Diversion Program (MDP). The 
newly-created National Dairy Promotion and Research Board is authorized until such time as 
dairy farmers or the Secretary of Agriculture withdraw support for it. The other features of the 
DPSA would expire at the end of 1985, to be replaced with a new farm bill.
Disorderly Marketing Conditions Created bv the MDP
The MDP was successful in reducing production in 1984, and net removals were cut in half 
as a result. Unfortunately (but predictably), as soon as the MDP expired, milk production and 
net removals quickly rebounded. Considerable increases in commercial disappearance helped 
but were not enough to balance markets (see Table 1). As Congress came closer to packaging a 
new farm bill in 1985, it was clear that additional measures would be needed to reduce govern­
ment support costs and balance markets. As with the 1983 bill, the final agreement contained a 
combination of price cuts, assessments, and special supply control measures, but there were 
some additional considerations now. Because production rebounded so rapidly after the expira­
tion of the MDP, it was easily decided that this program would not be repeated. Nevertheless 
many members of Congress and the dairy industry were still very much attracted by the concept 
of using special programs, above and beyond price cuts, to cut production and reduce the surplus. 
However, any new program would have to have longer lasting results. From this thinking the 
buyout or Dairy Termination Program (DTP) emerged. As the early discussions of a new supply 
control program evolved it was clear that it would have to avoid several defects in the old ap­
proach. One of these related to the regional impact of the MDP.
In a paper by Novakovic and Boynton, USDA estimates of 1983 milk production and data 
provided by participants in the MDP were used to estimate the state by state implications of the 
MDP for 1984/ The estimates of how much would be “diverted” as a percentage of 1983 actual 
production ranged from a low of 1.3% in Rhode Island to a high of 12.8% in Florida; the U.S. 
average was 4.2% By these estimates, the most affected states were in the South, including 
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Just to the 
north, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Illinois, and Iowa also had relatively large projected effects. 
The major milk producing states in the Northeast and Upper Midwest were projected to be 
affected the least of any area. Projected effects in the big western dairy states of California and
1 R.D. Boynton and A.M. Novakovic, The Impact of the Milk Diversion Program on U.S. Milk Production. 
A.E. Ext.84-4, Dept, o f Agr. Econ., Cornell University, March 1984, pp. 15-16.
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Washington were also below average. The net effects of production changes by producers who 
did not participate in the MDP were not considered.
USD A estimates of 
milk marketed by pro­
ducers in 1983 and 1984, 
as shown in Table 2, reveal 
what actually happened. 
Nationally, marketings 
declined 3.5%. Four states 
marketed more milk in 
1984 than in 1983. The 
greatest increase, 7.2%, 
occurred in New Mexico. 
California increased 3.7%. 
The other major dairy state 
on the Pacific coast, 
Washington, declined a 
modest 0.4%, placing it 
fifth in the ranking of states 
by changes in marketings 
relative to 1983. Although 
New England declined 
6.7%, New York and 
Pennsylvania declined 
much less— 1.6% and 
1.0%, respectively. In 
total, the decline through­
out the Northeast was 
below average, about 2.4%. 
Likewise, the impact in the 
Upper Midwest was fairly 
small in total, but each 
state was affected quite 
differently. Wisconsin 
declined only 1.5%, but 
nearby Illinois, Minnesota, 
Iowa, and South Dakota 
declined 6.5% to 8.5%.
The states showing the 
greatest declines were 
Kentucky (-15.1%), 
Nebraska (-14.8%), 
Missouri (-12.3%), Kansas 
(-11.8), Utah (-11.5%), and 
Honda (-10.5%).
Thus, three of the 
largest milk producing 
areas showed the least 
effect, i.e. Wisconsin, New 
York-Pennsylvania, and
Table 2. Milk Marketed By Producers, 1983 and 1984.
State 1222 1984 84/83 State. M m
AL 570 528 -7.37% NM 7.24%
AZ 1230 1215 -1.22% CA 3.72%
AR 823 778 -5.47% NV 3.60%
CA 14688 15235 3.72% WV 1.13%
CO 932 903 -3.11% WA -0.41%
CT 645 601 -6.82% PA -1.01%
DE 135 130 -3.70% AZ -1.22%
FL 2099 1879 -10.48% WI -1.47%
GA 1380 1260 -8.70% WY -1.55%
ID 2250 2144 -4.71% NY -1.62%
IL 2675 2502 -6.47% OR -2.12%
IN 2330 2233 -4.16% RI -2.33%
IA 3924 3611 -7.98% OH -2.64%
KS 1357 1197 -11.79% CO -3.11%
KY 2330 1979 -15.06% MI -3.37%
LA 932 869 -6.76% US -3.50%
ME 722 682 -5.54% TX -3.61%
MD 1592 1516 -4.77% DE -3.70%
MA 603 563 -6.63% ND -3.79%
MI 5428 5245 -3.37% NC -3.86%
MN 10835 10065 -7.11% IN -4.16%
MS 873 830 -4.93% ID -4.71%
MO 3055 2680 -12.27% MD -4.77%
MT 336 319 -5.06% MS -4.93%
NE 1385 1180 -14.80% MT -5.06%
NV 222 230 3.60% NH -5.11%
NH 372 353 -5.11% OK -5.20%
NJ 492 465 -5.49% VA -5.37%
NM 926 993 7.24% AR -5.47%
NY 11388 11203 -1.62% NJ -5.49%
NC 1656 1592 -3.86% ME -5.54%
ND 1055 1015 -3.79% SC -5.70%
OH 4704 4580 -2.64% IL -6.47%
OK 1153 1093 -5.20% MA -6.63%
OR 1321 1293 -2.12% LA -6.76%
PA 9367 9272 -1.01% CT -6.82%
RI 43 42 -2.33% MN -7.11%
SC 561 529 -5.70% TN -7.34%
SD 1752 1604 -8.45% VT -7.35%
TN 2166 2007 -7.34% AL -7.37%
TX 3937 3795 -3.61% IA -7.98%
UT 1148 1016 -11.50% SD -8.45%
VT 2448 2268 -7.35% GA -8.70%
VA 2050 1940 -5.37% FL -10.48%
WA 3455 3441 -0.41% UT -11.50%
WV 355 359 1.13% KS -11.79%
WI 23243 22901 -1.47% MO -12.27%
WY 129 127 -1.55% NE -14.80%
KY -15.06%
US 137228 132421 -3.50%
Source: "Milk-Final Estimates, 1983-1987, USDA
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California. The South, Com Belt, and Northern Plains states were most affected. The area that 
probably had the hardest time coping with these changes is the Southeast. This is an area that 
chronically must seek supplemental milk supplies to satisfy just the fluid milk demands of its 
local population. Other areas that saw similarly large reductions in marketings did not have that 
added factor to contend with. Southern cooperatives found themselves hard pressed to fulfill 
their supply commitments to local handlers.
Changing Federal Orders to Offset Disorderly Marketing 
Conditions that Might be Created bv the DTP
Having gone through these difficulties in 1984, it is not surprising that Southern cooperatives 
were not as enthusiastic as their Northern counterparts about a new supply control program for 
the 1985 farm bill. Dairy marketing cooperatives finally agreed on a proposal for the 1985 farm 
bill that they would take to Congress. The agreement included supply control measures, but it 
also contained two provisions related to federal orders. One was to increase class I differentials 
on an order by order basis, with the increase being greatest in the South and smallest in the 
Upper Midwest/ The second legislative change was to enable federal orders to be amended in 
ways that would allow handlers who provided marketwide services to be compensated from pool 
receipts. The law did not require payments; rather it modified permanent law to permit orders to 
be amended so as to include such payments. It was believed that these two measures would help 
Southerners and others mitigate the disruptive local effects that otherwise might occur with a 
new national supply control program.
Thus the new differentials were proposed by dairy cooperatives to make supply controls 
more palatable to the Southeast, from both a political and economic perspective. Likewise, the 
possibility of amending an order so as to include payments for marketwide services also pro­
vided a tool to help mitigate the procurement and balancing difficulties that might be created by 
a new supply control program. It is also true that there were quite a few voices in the dairy 
industry that thought increasing differentials and providing for marketwide service payments 
were sensible things to do whether there was going to be a new supply control program or not.
In the case of marketwide service payments, Congress permanently amended federal order 
legislation but did not require any particular provisions or payments. Perhaps this indicates that 
Congress thought this was a reasonable practice in principle but did not feel comfortable in 
requiring a specific implementation. In the case of the differentials, Congress required certain 
changes and made them stay in effect for two years, or about as long as it would take to phase in 
the DTP. This indicates that Congress saw the two as linked. Insofar as Congress did not auto­
matically rescind the differentials after two years this is an indication that they were persuaded 
that a permanent change might be warranted and that a decision either way should be left to more 
normal administrative processes.
2 New England was affected in ways very similar to the Southeast. Although the production-consumption balance 
is not as tight, New England cooperatives found it difficult to adjust to the rather large and sudden declines in 
production by their members. This would affect how New England viewed future dairy policies, including federal 
orders.
3 This might be viewed as an increase in the implicit transportation differential component of the class I differential, 
although it should be noted that the increase was not on a strict distance relationship and differentials were increased 
much less to the east of Wisconsin and more to the south.
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Declining Market Prices Led to Regionalism
Farmers everywhere were affected by the cuts in the support price which began on December 
1,1983. From November 1983 to January 1990, the support price fell $3.00 per cwt or 23%. 
Actual market prices for milk generally followed the downward trend, but they have also been 
affected by the MDP, the DTP, and economic conditions largely related to the 1988 drought. 
These patterns are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the support price, M-W price, and all 
milk price from 1979 to 1990.
Figure 1. M-W Support, A ll Milk Prices
($/cwt @ 3.5% bf; All Milk at avg fat)
Support P r i c e --------------- M-W Price --------------- All Milk Price
Two basic points will be drawn from the fact that milk prices have been declining. The first 
has to do with the extent to which individual states showed similar price declines. The second 
relates to how farmers reacted to these price declines.
Using data on the annual average grade A milk prices reported by USD A for 1983 to 1989, 
the correlation of changes in each state’s average price with the U.S. average was calculated, as 
reported in Table 3 / Fifteen states have a calculated correlation coefficient of 99%. Eleven fall 
in a range from 95% to 98%. Ten are in the range 90% to 94%. Prices in these 36 states could 
be said to follow the national average price extremely closely. Seven are in a range from 80% to 
89%, still a very close relationship. Four are in the range from 70% to 79%. One state, Florida,
4 These are Pearson correlation coefficients, measuring the linear association of or relationship between two vari­
ables. In this case, perfect correlation would occur if a change in the national average price equal to X was always 
matched by a change of Ytf in a state’s price. In other words, the change need not be identical (Y does not have to 
equal X).
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has a weak correlation of 33%. This illustrates that the vast majority of states saw grade A prices 
move in nearly identical fashion from 1983 to 1989. This includes states in which nearly all of 
the milk produced is priced under a federal order, such as New York, and states such as Califor­
nia in which none of the milk is priced under a federal order.
Table 3. Correlation of State Average Grade A Milk Prices with U.S. 
_________ Average, 1983-1989__________________________________
State______Correlation_________________ State_________ Correlation
IA 0.997 . OK 0.958
MO 0.996 NV 0.948
VT 0.996 TN 0.941
WV 0.995 CA 0.929
SD 0.995 MD 0.927
IL 0.993 MS 0.925
NH 0.992 NY 0.918
CO 0.991 DE 0.915
WA 0.990 MT 0.912
MI 0.988 AL 0.912
CT 0.988 ID 0.905
AZ 0.988 PA 0.902
KY 0.987 VA 0.888
MN 0.986 AR 0.877
IN 0.986 NM 0.870
TX 0.983 LA 0.854
ND 0.982 NE 0.835
MA 0.982 KS 0.834
RI 0.975 WY 0.816
WI 0.975 SC 0.779
OH 0.973 NJ 0.775
UT 0.973 GA 0.737
ME 0.969 NC 0.707
OR 0.966 FL 0.332
For the most part, there is no 
apparent regional pattern to the 
states which are most closely 
correlated with the national 
average. If one focuses on the 
top ten dairy states, four exhibit 
the highest correlation of 99%. 
These are Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Washington. 
Obviously three of the four are 
in the Upper Midwest; however 
Wisconsin is not in this group, 
and, because Washington is, 
one cannot draw any strong 
conclusions based on region. If 
one excludes 1989, when prices 
moved sharply upward, na­
tional milk prices declined on a 
downward trend of about 280 
per year from 1983 to 1988.
The trend rate decline for Iowa, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Washington was about 320, 
280,280, and 250 respectively. 
This illustrates that even with 
equally high correlations, the 
linear trend rates can be a bit 
different from one state to the 
next.
The second highest group includes Texas (98%), Wisconsin (97.5%), and Ohio (97%). The 
only thing interesting about this regionally disparate group is the fact that Wisconsin and Texas 
prices are about equally correlated with the national average price, despite the fact that class I 
differentials in Texas were increased much more than in the orders affecting Wisconsin. The 
trend rate decline for Texas, Wisconsin, and Ohio was about 230, 270, and 310 respectively. As 
with the earlier group, the trend rate declines are not identical to the national average, but they 
are very similar.
California, New York, and Pennsylvania are in the third highest group. Possibly, this reveals 
some relationship between states that are heavily populated with both cows and people. The 
trend rate decline for California, New York, and Pennsylvania was about 410, 220, and 190 
respectively. In this group we start to see bigger differences in trend rate declines relative to the 
national average. California’s price decline was much steeper than that in the Northeast.
The states whose prices have been most poorly correlated with the national average are 
Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, New Jersey, and South Carolina. Florida stands in a class by
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itself. With the obvious exception of New Jersey, all of these states are in the extreme southeast­
ern U.S. The trend rate decline for Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, New Jersey, and South 
Carolina was about 180,70, 60,150, and 140 respectively. Thus, prices for this group declined 
at a substantially lower rate than the national average. It may be interesting to note that although 
Florida prices showed far and away the poorest correlation, the trend rate decline was closer to 
the national average than the next four states in this group.
Closer examination of the data indicates that the primary way in which state prices deviated 
from the national average is that some states showed larger price increases in 1987, whereas the 
national average increased only trivially. Some states showed deviations in 1985 or 1988. In the 
case of Florida, the major departure from the national trend occurred in 1985. Thus, one might 
guess that local effects created by the MDP or the DTP explain most of the departure from the 
national trend. One might note that there are no apparent effects from the change in class I 
differentials, which took effect in 1986. (This will be examined more carefully in the next major 
section.)
All of this is simply to say that changes in grade A prices across states from 1983 to 1989 are 
more similar than they are different. Moreover, the basic trend in prices either nationally or in 
states seems to be influenced much more by changes in price support policy than by changes in 
federal order policy.
As indicated earlier, there is a second point to looking at these price trends. It has to do with 
how farmers reacted to declining prices. In the early 1980s, the clarion call for dairy farmers 
was national unity. With each new cut in the support price, farmers everywhere began to think 
more about whose fault these cuts were. Over time it became more common for farmers in one 
area to wonder who was creating this troublesome surplus that was reducing “their” prices. The 
“we’re all in this together” mentality gave way to a feeling that “its not my fault.” Each region 
could point to a characteristic that would exonerate it as the region causing the surplus.5 In 
addition, it became common for each region to propose solutions to the surplus problem that 
were clearly targeted against one region or another. This phenomenon came to be called region­
alism.
Farmers in the Southeast could point to the fact that their markets are clearly the most deficit 
of any region and sales to the CCC are almost non-existent. In the Northeast, production was 
increasing slowly and price support sales to the CCC were very low. California farmers have the 
lowest grade A prices in the country and are obviously among the lowest cost milk producers in 
the U.S.; because of this they didn’t think that their large production increases and sales to the 
CCC should be held against them. In the Upper Midwest, primarily Wisconsin and Minnesota, 
criticisms of large sales to the CCC were countered by charges that federal order provisions, in 
one fashion or another, prevented them from marketing their products in the South and else­
where. Their argument was that they wouldn’t have to sell so much to the CCC if federal orders 
didn’t cause too much milk to be produced elsewhere.
Another factor that seems to have influenced this sort of regional thinking is an apparent 
belief that cuts in the support price affect prices for milk used in manufacturing more so than 
prices for milk used in fluid products. In other words, the Upper Midwest, as the largest milk 
manufacturing region, bears the brunt of price support cuts, but other markets which are more 1*
1 Many of these regional factors are reviewed in the following paper Andrew M. Novakovic and Maura Keniston,
Regional Differences in the Dairy Industry and Their Use in Evaluating Dairy Surpluses. AJ3. E xt 89-3, Dept, of
Agr. Econ., Cornell University, January 1989.
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oriented toward fluid product sales are protected by federal orders. Inasmuch as federal orders 
do emphasize fluid markets and the price support program deals directly with manufactured 
products, this interpretation is perhaps understandable. It is, nevertheless, an incorrect analysis. 
As the state price analysis above indicates, all milk prices move together quite closely. Inas­
much as all federal order class prices are tied to the M-W price, this should be no surprise.
Congress has firmly resisted all suggestions that price support policy be changed in ways that 
would clearly target effects on certain regions; simply because what is ultimately a national body 
is not inclined to pass national policies that purposefully favor or penalize one region over 
another. Because the nub of the Upper Midwestern response to surplus problems involves 
federal orders, their suggestions can be heard in a different venue. In this case, Congress doesn’t 
have to judge these regionally motivated proposals, they can pass the responsibility to the Secre­
tary of Agriculture. Inasmuch as federal orders are much more complex than the DPSP, it is well 
that Congress did not attempt to address these important issues legislatively.
It is quite possible that the single most important motivation for Midwestern proposals to 
reduce class I differentials in regions removed from the Upper Midwest stems from their views 
with respect to how they have fared relative to other regions as price supports have declined. 
Furthermore, it is a virtual certainty that the national hearing would not have been held had the 
dairy industry been able to avoid the surplus problem and price cuts of the 1980s. This suggests 
to us that the fundamental problem facing the dairy industry has been a dairy price support policy 
problem, not a federal order policy problem. This conclusion is further bolstered by the several 
proposals offered to the hearing which would mix the support price and the class III price by 
putting a floor under the class III price. The use of FMMO pricing policy solely for the purpose 
of “correcting” or “counteracting” what are basically consequences of DPSP policy is ill-advised 
and confuses the legitimate purposes of FMMOs.
Regional Production of Manufactured Dairy Products
The second major factor motivating proposals to change class I differentials derives from 
concerns about regional changes in the production of manufactured dairy products. These 
concerns are closely related to concerns that federal order pricing distorts milk production incen­
tives. One Midwest advocate expressed this point of view well in his testimony. He stated:
“Class prices and producer prices for milk in all markets and changes in them 
are of consequence to the entire U.S. milk industry, regardless of the amount of 
milk that moves between markets in fluid form. These impacts result largely 
because the market for products in the lowest use class o f federal orders, the 
manufactured dairy products market, is a national market which is impacted 
anytime that changes in milk production and consumption (of either fluid or 
manufactured products) occur anywhere in the US.”
He proceeds to offer an example of how an increase in the class I differential in all “South 
Atlantic” orders would result in increased milk production in that area, all of which would go 
into class ID. This would in turn depress “the national manufacturing milk price,” implying 
lower prices for everyone else.
This argument has deep historical roots. Dairy markets during the decade of the 1950s bear a 
striking similarity to what we saw in the 1980s. In 1949, the support price was pegged at 90% of 
parity. USDA purchased some dairy products that year and decided it should reduce supports to
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81% of parity in 1951. Markets tightened up in 1951. Consequently, the support price was 
returned to 90% of parity. In terms of dollars per cwt, it increased 17% in 1951 and another 8% 
in 1952. Between FY1952-53 and FY1953-54, net removals jumped from 3.6 to 11.3 billion 
pounds. At the beginning of FY1954-55, the Secretary of Agriculture exercised his authority to 
reduce the support price to 75% of parity, which lowered the price by 590/cwt or 16%. Net 
removals were cut in half that year. For the rest of the 1950s the support price was pegged 
between 75% and 85% of parity. The average market price of milk fell substantially from 1952 
to 1955 and was relatively flat for the rest of the 1950s; in fact milk prices would not again reach 
the level they had attained in 1952 until 1967. The support price and the average national price 
for all milk during the 1950s is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Support and All Milk Prices
(S/cwt @3.5% bf; All Milk at avg fat)
Support P r i c e --------------- All Milk Price
Just as the difficult farm prices of the 1980s have led to regional infighting, a dispute broke 
out between the Upper Midwest and the Northeast in the late 1950s. One of the Invited Papers 
sessions at the 1960 annual meeting of the American Farm Economics Association was entitled 
“The Midwest-Eastern Seaboard Conflict of Interest in the Production and Distribution of Milk.” 
Several papers were presented and discussed in this session. Two of them illustrate the parallel 
between the situations in 1960 and 1990. Dubov and Downen of the University of Tennessee 
presented their views, largely in defense of the Northeast/ After reviewing some production 
statistics since 1950, they state: *
* Irving Dubov and M. Lloyd Downen, “The Midwest-Eastern Seaboard Conflict of Interest in the Production and 
Distribution of Milk: The Role of Market Structures and Other Institutional Arrangements,” Journal of Farm 
Economics. Vol. 42, no. 5, December 1960, pp. 1313-1327.
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“So it would seem that Midwest dairy farmers, especially those in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota, have expanded production considerably over the past ten years, and 
apparently are producing more milk at existing prices than is required in the 
immediate area; and they would like to sell some of this “extra" milk in regulated 
markets in other areas, including the Eastern Seaboard....so, what is the conflict 
of interest between producers in the two areas?. ..The answer is simply that Mid­
west producers would like to increase their total returns from the sale o f milk 
produced for fluid uses and feel that if they could sell some o f their milk in 
Eastern markets, they could do so." (p. 1322).
After reviewing regional differences in prices and transportation costs, the authors conclude that 
Midwestern producers cannot feasibly serve Northeastern markets. They offer the following 
advice to Midwesterners who are dissatisfied with their prices:
“we submit that the relevant area o f concern for improving the market power 
position o f Midwest producers is not the conflict o f interest between them and 
Eastern Seaboard producers. Rather, it is the conflict o f interest between Mid­
west producers and the Midwest handlers to whom they sell their milk. To obtain 
higher returns for their fluid milk, Midwest producers should take the direct 
approach o f altering market power institutions within their own marketing areas, 
rather than pursuing the illusory benefits o f sales in seemingly lucrative Eastern 
Seaboard markets." (p.1327).7
Today the focus is perhaps more on fluid markets and prices in the Southeast than the North­
east, and on production in the Southwest and Far West rather than the Midwest. Nevertheless, 
the similarity between the views of Dubov and Downen in 1960 and those expressed by “East­
erners” today should be obvious.
Juers of the Wisconsin Council of Agriculture Cooperatives responded to the paper by 
Dubov and Downen.4 He challenges their analysis by saying that they focused on the wrong 
issue:
“The authors seem to have confined their concept o f the conflict situation to the 
production and marketing o f fluid milk. By so doing I  think they have excluded 
the major contention o f competitive interest being expounded by the Midwest. An 
earlier phase o f the conflict possibly did center on Midwestern desires to ship 
additional supplies of fluid milk to the higher priced markets o f the East. Interest 
of this nature, however, seems to have subsided as the feasibility of making such 
shipments has been challenged if not disproved repeatedly by various research 
efforts...At present the conflict seems to center more on the effect o f surplus 
[manufactured] products from fluid milk markets as they contribute to generally 
low prices for manufactured milk and the inability o f Midwestern producers to 
manifest such comparative advantage as they might have in the production o f 
manufactured dairy products due to the rigors o f the varied regulatory institu­
tions affecting milk pricing and marketing. This competitive advantage may lie 
entirely in the production o f milk for manufactured products, in which case the *
7 With the advent of the Central Milk Producers Cooperative and other individual but large regional cooperatives in 
the Midwest, it is interesting to note that in some sense this prescription has been followed.
* Linley E. Juers, “Discussion: The Role of Market Structures and Other Institutional Arrangements,” Journal of 
Farm Economics. Vol. 42, no. 5, December 1960, pp. 1327-1331.
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point o f interest is not the exclusion o f these products from markets but the pro­
tective umbrella which the classified pricing system places over the competitors 
which Midwestern producers face in the product markets.” (pp. 1328-29).
In other words, the Midwestern concern of 1960 and 1990 is that their manufactured product 
competitors in distant markets have an unfair advantage because their competitors’ blend prices 
are lx>lstered by pooled class I differentials. These distorted blend prices create additional milk 
supplies and manufactured dairy products that otherwise would not exist. The net result is 
displaced Midwestern manufactured products and even lower prices. This concern was focused 
on the Northeast in 1960. Today it extends to much of the South, especially Texas. The much 
publicized construction of a cheese plant in Stephenville, Texas, following a period of very rapid 
and large growth in milk production in that area, did much to convince Wisconsin farmers of the 
validity of this line of reasoning.
The disputes of the late 1950s did lead to some changes in federal orders. During the 1960s, 
prices for the so-called surplus classes of federal orders were standardized across orders. This 
ultimately led to the M-W price being used as the basic formula price in all orders.5* At about the 
same time, the rationale for establishing class I differentials became more systematized. This 
will be discussed further in the third section of this testimony. '
Deregulation Objectives
The third factor which led to the 1990 hearing is very different from the other two, which is 
probably not surprising because it comes mostly from outside of the dairy industry. One of the 
key features of the Reagan era is deregulation—the dismantling or reduction of government 
regulations on economic activity. The ongoing legacy of the deregulation mentality is driven at 
least in part by budget requirements, but the original motivation was surely more ideological.
Some proposals were made at the hearing to eliminate class I differentials and thereby begin 
the dismantling of federal orders. The details of these proposals indicate a heavy reliance on free 
market doctrine and a lack of understanding about why federal orders were created and why they 
might be justified today. Inasmuch as federal orders were created to correct the inherent anti­
competitive characteristics of dairy markets, it is ironic that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Departmentof Justice was the leading proponent of dismantling federal orders. The inherent 
oligopsonistic structure of dairy markets may well still be a valid justification for federal or­
ders." The intent of these proposals should not be confused with other proposals which seek a 
new alignment of class I prices. It is one thing to tune federal orders; it is quite another to turn 
them off.
Factors Affecting Regional Changes in Milk Production
As indicated above, proponents of proposals to reduce class I differentials outside of the 
Upper Midwest assert that federal orders have led to excessive production in certain other re- *
* For further information on the M-W price as the basic formula price, one can refer to: Andrew Novakovic, 
“Alternatives to the M-W Price as the Basis for Setting Prices Under Federal Milk Marketing Orders,” Leaflet 25, 
Dairy Policy Issues and Ontions for the 1990 Farm Bill. Dept, of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, 1990.
" Andrew M. Novakovic and Robert D. Boynton, “Do Chariges in Fanner-First Handler Exchange Eliminate the 
Need for Government Intervention,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 66, no. 5, December 1984, 
pp. 769-775.
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gions, to the detriment of Upper Midwestern producers. Testimony was offered which purports 
to demonstrate that the increases in class I differentials in 1986 led to directly correlated in­
creases in producer deliveries. In this section, results of statistical analyses of relationships 
implied by these assertions are examined.
The Use of Federal Order Data to Estimate Milk Supply
Economic theory of supply, and common sense, indicate that production is affected by price. 
For economists, the term supply denotes a relationship between price and quantity, i.e. how 
much of a product is supplied at different price levels. Thus, supply is, strictly speaking, not the 
same as quantity supplied or production. In this case, we are talking about the production of 
milk by dairy farmers and, presumably, the price that dairy farmers receive. As simple and 
obvious as this may seem, when we are trying to describe milk supply relationships it should be 
recognized that federal order producer receipts are not the same as production and that federal 
order prices are not the same as the market prices farmers receive. What this means is that when 
we use federal order data to talk about milk supply, we are using data that do not correspond 
perfectly to the variables in the economic theory of supply.
The closest thing to production in federal order data is “producer deliveries of milk to han­
dlers” or what is typically referred to as “producer receipts.” This differs from production in two 
ways. First, it is the amount of milk a producer markets, not how much he produces. National 
data indicate that about 1.5% of the milk produced stays on farms for farm use and thus is not 
part of farm marketings (cf. Table 1). Marketings do not differ greatly from production on most 
farms, but there can be variations over time or across farms.
Second, and more importantly, producer receipts measure the marketings of milk to handlers 
regulated under a particular federal order. Thus, producer receipts for any particular order can 
vary from time to time because farmers are producing different amounts of milk or because there 
are fewer or more farmer’s associated with that order. The latter occurs when farmers go out of 
business and when a farmer’s milk is moved from a handler regulated under one order to a 
handler regulated under another order. Similar changes also occur when a handler changes its 
sales patterns and becomes regulated under a different order, and takes its producers to the new 
order with it. It is difficult, if not impossible, from the quantity data normally published by AMS 
to ascertain the extent to which producer receipts are affected by producer milk shifting from one 
order to another, however it is well known that this occurs and occasionally leads to significant 
changes in the producer receipts reported for an order.
Likewise, federal order prices are not the prices farmers actually receive. Certainly, class I 
differentials, and class prices are not prices farmers actually receive. Moreover, the minimum 
federal order blend price is generally not the price farmers receive. Farmers may receive more 
or, in some cases, less than the blend price. Farmers receive more when processors or coopera­
tives pay them premiums. Farmers receive less when their cooperative must “reblend” by 
withholding part of the minimum price to cover extraordinary expenses. Special federal assess­
ments, subsidized hauling, cooperative dividends, and other special factors can and do cause 
what farmers see as their price to look different from federal order minimum blend prices. At 
best, federal order blend prices are an approximate measure of farm prices; they may be a very 
poor measure of the milk prices on which farmers base their production decisions.
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Mailbox Prices
Evidence of this is provided by a study of so-called mailbox prices conducted by various 
Market Administrators/7 The study calculated a mailbox price as the blend price at a particular 
zone or location plus premiums minus cooperative reblends minus hauling deductions minus 
cooperative deductions. Data were collected for the following order locations: Chicago Re­
gional Zone 4 (an area mostly serving class I handlers), Chicago Regional Zone 16 (an area 
mostly serving class HI handlers), the Southwest Region (Central Arkansas, Wichita, Tulsa, 
Southwest Plains, and Texas Panhandle), and Texas (Dallas). The following months were used 
to compare relationships before and after class I differentials were changed and during different 
seasons of the year: May 1985, October 1985, May 1987, and October 1987.
Key results of the study are summarized in Table 4. In general, they reveal that changes in 
prices actually received by farmers can be a little different or a lot different from that implied by 
changes in blend prices. For example, from 1985 to 1987 the spread between blend prices in the 
Chicago Order (Zone 4 and 16) and the average blend prices in the several orders grouped in the 
Southwest Region (mostly north of Texas) increased 110 in the flush season (May) and 370 in 
the tight Fall season (October). (This reflects the greater effect of higher Fall class I utilization 
in a higher class I market.) However, the mailbox prices indicate that the spread between milk 
prices actually decreased 150 to 230 in May and 130 to 220 in October. In the case of Texas, the 
spread between both blend prices and mailbox prices increased, but the spread between mailbox 
prices increased less. Blend prices in Texas were 150 higher in May and 590 higher in October. 
Mailbox prices were 30 to 50 higher in May and 270 to 360 higher in October.
Table 4. Differences Between Blend and Mailbox Prices in Wisconsin and the Southwest (S/cwt).
Blend Mailbox
1985 1987 m i 1985 1987 87-85
October
Zone 4-Zone 16 .27 .27 0 .06 -.03 -.09
Southwest - Zone 4 .80 1.17 .37 .40 .27 -.13
Southwest - Zone 16 1.07 1.44 .37 .46 2 4 -22
Texas - Zone 4 1.25 1.84 .59 .94 1.30 .36
Texas - Zone 16 1.52 2.11 .59 1.00 127 .27
May
Zone 4 - Zone 16 .27 .27 0 .05 -.03 -.08
Southwest -Zone 4 .90 1.01 .11 .17 .02 -.15
Southwest - Zone 16 1.17 1.28 .11 .22 -.01 -.23
Texas - Zone 4 1.48 1.63 .15 .97 1.00 .03
Texas - Zone 16________ ____ L25______ L90___ _____ A1____________ 1.02 ______3lL__________ m
" A series of articles under the title “Study of the Chicago Regional Mailbox Price (Zone 4 and Zone 16) Compared 
to Other Federal Orders” were published in the following issues of the Reporter, the monthly publication of the 
Market Administrator’s Office for the Chicago Regional and Indiana Marketing Areas: “Part One,” September 
1988, pp. 5-8; “Part Two,” October 1988, pp. 5-7; “Parts Three and Four,” December 1988, pp. 5-12; “Part Five,” 
January 1989, pp. 7-10; and February 1989, pp. 5-8.
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The major reason for these seemingly perverse results is that producers in the Chicago 
Regional Order area had higher over-order premiums in 1987. Net premiums in the Southwest 
Region Order areas and the Texas Order area declined from 1985 to 1987. It is unclear how 
much of any of these changes were caused by the increase in differentials. It seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that the increase in differentials in the Southwest Region and Texas tended to take 
pressure off for competitive premiums and may have even had the opposite effect in the Chicago 
Regional area.
Estimates of Price and Quantity Relationships
Because they do not conform well to actual farm prices and production, federal order data 
would not normally be used to estimate milk supply relationships (i.e. how production is affected 
by changes in price).12 If they must be used, a careful study would try to determine if any of the 
individual order data reflected changes in where producer milk was marketed. For supply analy­
sis, it is important to know when producer receipts declined because a set of farms produced less 
milk versus a decline caused by some farms marketing their milk under another order.
In the next two sections we will show the statistical relationships between l)various mea­
sures of federal order and farm prices and 2)various measures of price and producer receipts or 
production. In all cases the data are for the years 1985 and 1987 and are either Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) data on individual federal orders or National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) data on states which most closely correspond to each federal order milkshed.
The following federal order data are used: blend prices, class I prices, class I differentials, and 
producer receipts (all prices are measured at 3.5% milkfat). Class I prices announced by coop­
eratives (3.5% milkfat), as reported by AMS in Dairy Market News, are also used. The data 
from NASS are: state average grade A prices at 3.67% milkfat and total production. All data are 
expressed as the percentage change from 1985 to 1987 (1987 minus 1985, divided by 1985, 
times 100). This allows us to compare the effects of price changes across orders (or states) that 
have very different levels of producer receipts (production)." The two years of 1985 and 1987 
are chosen simply because the are the first full years on either side of the change in class I differ­
entials.
The procedure used to estimate the relationships reported below is ordinary least squares.
The quality or2strength of the estimated relationship is indicated by two statistics—the r and the 
t-value. The r is a measure of how accurately an equation predicts a particular variable; a value 
of 1 is perfect; a value of 0 is the worst it could be. The t-value provides an indication of how 
accurate the measure of a particular explanatory variable’s effect on the dependant variable is. 
Theoretically, the t-value could range from 0 to infinity. Generally speaking, a t-value over 2 is 
considered fairly good in economic research.
How Changes in Differentials Affected Prices
Four combinations of prices were studied. In each case the 1985 to 1987 percentage change 
of one price is used to “explain” or estimate the percentage change in another price. The esti­
mated equations are as follows:
" Another reason why federal order data is not used to estimate milk supply behavior is that supply models typically 
include variables such as feed and other input prices, measures of technology, prices of alternative uses of farm 
resources (e.g. beef prices for cull cattle or returns from alternative enterprises). Such data are not available on a 
federal order basis.
u Scaling is not a problem when comparing prices across different orders. Regressions on price data were also done 
using the absolute change in prices. The results are qualitatively and substantively identical for all practical pur­
poses.
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%PI = -2.87 + 0.16 * %DIFFI x = .91
t = 44.4
%Blend = -0.20 + 0.78 * %PI x = .91
t = 20.3
%COOPI = -0.24 + 0.66 * %PI x = .60
t = 5.6
%PA = -1.00 + 0.54 * %Blend x = .29
t = 4.0
where,
PI = the class I price for each order
Blend = the blend price for each order
COOPI = the class I price announced by cooperatives
PA = the average grade A price for each state
*%’ denotes the percentage change from 1985 to 1987
These equations can be translated in the following fashion. For example, the first equation says 
that every l^o increase in the class I differential is associated with a 0.16% increase in the class I 
price. The r for this equation says that, for 1985 to 1987, the percentage change in the class I 
differential provides a very good estimate of the percentage change in class I prices. The t-value 
says that the specific impact of 0.16 points for every one percent change in the class I differential 
is very accurate or precise.
Examination of each equation indicates that percentage change in the class I differential 
provides a good indication of the percentage change in the class I price and the percentage 
change in class I price provides an equally good measure of the percentage change in the blend 
price, across all orders. From this we might state, as a general conclusion, that if we know the 
change in one federal order price, we can probably guess fairly accurately what will be the 
change in another minimum price for the same order.
However, the percentage change in the class I price is not a very good measure of the per­
centage change in the class I prices cooperatives announced that they were actually charging for 
milk. In addition, the percentage change in the blend price provides a rather poor estimate of the 
percentage change in the grade A price of the state most closely corresponding to each federal 
order. Because the data don’t correspond to the same farms, the latter is a problematic equation. 
Nonetheless, the third and fourth equations imply that percentage changes in federal order 
minimum prices were not reliable indicators of what happened to prices we might characterize as 
more accurately reflecting actual market prices.
How Changes in Prices Correspond to Changes in Production
Similar regression analyses were also conducted using different measures of quantities as a 
function of different prices. The following results were obtained:
%RECT = 1.67 - 0.02 * %DIFFI r = .0007 
t = 0.12
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%RECT = 1.29 - 0.03 * %PI t = .0001 
t = 0.03
%RECT = 3.04 - 0.59 * %Blend x = .009
t = 0.6
%PROD = 1.37-0.05* %DIFFI r2=.02 
t = 0.8
%PROD = 0.49-0.1 *%PI r2 = .002 
t = 0.26
%PROD = 0.45 - 0.3 * %Blend r2 = .01 
t = 0.7
%PROD = -0.29-0.72* %PAr2 = .07
t = 0.4
where,
RECT = producer deliveries of milk used by handlers, by order
PROD = grade A milk production, by state
and all other variables are as defined earlier.
The interpretation of these results follows the same logic as for the earlier results. For ex­
ample, the first equation says that a 1% increase in the class I differential, is associated with a 
0.02 point decrease in the percentage change of producer receipts. The r of almost zero indi­
cates that percentage change in class I differential is an extremely poor indicator of relative 
changes in producer receipts. The very low t-value indicates that whatever statistical relationship 
exists between these two variables, the parameter value of -0.16 is a rough approximation at best.
All equations are characterized by negative parameter estimates (higher prices are associated 
with lower production and vice versa). At face value, this means that the way to increase quanti­
ties supplied in an area is to lower price. These perverse relationships are all quite meaningless 
insofar as the equation statistics all indicate that the quality of these estimates are exceedingly 
poor. Whether we look at the effect of an order price on producer receipts or the effect of state 
average prices on state milk production, there is no statistical evidence here to even remotely 
support a claim that changes in production or producer receipts, over this time period and for 
these orders and states, can be accurately predicted from contemporaneous changes in the vari­
ous alternative price variables.
These results are not offered as a repudiation of the economic theory of supply. In fact one 
could argue just the opposite. Economic theory says that production of an item is affected by 
more than just the selling price of that item. The analysis done above falls apart for several 
reasons. In some cases the price used to predict quantity changes is only partially related to the 
selling prices that actually apply to farmers. Even where the price and quantity variables corre­
spond rather closely to the farm level variables consistent with theory, the equations leave out all 
the other variables that affect production, such as the price of inputs used to produce milk, the 
value of alternative uses of farm resources, changes in farm productivity, and so on. Just as 
Boynton and Novakovic were only partly correct in forecasting the effects of the MDP on a state 
by state basis, so forecasts of changes in producer marketings will be only partly correct if they
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are based on changes in federal order prices. In fact, such forecasts may be extremely inaccu­
rate. Similarly, any forecast of the effects of proposed changes in class I differentials which does 
not take into account the complexities of local supply (and demand) situations will be equally 
flawed. Simple analyses may be useful as a way to get a ballpark idea of what might happen, but 
they can be misleading. Inasmuch as it is extremely difficult to deal with these complexities, in 
our opinion any analysis of the effect of proposed changes in class I differentials on marketings 
in a particular area must be considered a rough approximation at best.
It is not our purpose to enter a lengthy discussion of what other factors may have influenced 
production growth in the past or how they might affect future growth. Growth trends on a state 
by state basis have been discussed and analyzed elsewhere." We did not attempt to analyze 
causal factors in that study, but it is obvious from it that states which have very similar prices 
have had very different patterns of growth.
It may be useful to note that the two states that have increased milk production (total volume) 
the most over the long term (since 1960) are the two largest milk producing states—California 
and Wisconsin. These increases obviously occurred in spite of or regardless of any federal order 
policies. Moreover the states that have shown the most rapid percentage growth in milk produc­
tion are primarily the states in the West which either do not have federal orders (California) or in 
which class I differentials were not altered by the 1985 Food Security Act (FSA) and are gener­
ally fairly low (New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and Idaho). Of the states 
which saw increases in differentials, only two have experienced large percentage growth over the 
longer term; these are Texas and Florida. Growth in Florida has been occurring for many years. 
The more recent very rapid growth in Texas production does appear to coincide with changes in 
class I differentials. Nonetheless, any relationship between the two is likely to be more coinci­
dental than causal. The fact that growth in Texas has substantially abated in 1990 and 1991 is a 
further indication that production changes are the result of many factors.
Changes in Differentials and Class I Utilization
Testimony presented at the hearing included a table which compared, on an order by order 
basis, changes in the class I differential and class I utilization from 1985 to 1988. Upon referring 
to this table, the author stated: “The statistical relationship between utilization change and 
differential change is negative and significant.” He offers no statistical analysis to substantiate 
this statement We used the data presented in his table to calculate the following equation, using 
ordinary least squares regression analysis:
Class I Utilization = 1.64 - 4.44 * DlFFl x = .07 
t = 1.5
where,
Class I Utilization = the change in class I utilization from 1985 to 1988, in percents 
DlFFl = the change in class I differentials from 1985 to 1988, in dollars per
cwt
According to this equation, every $0.10 increase in the class I differential was associated with a 
decline in class I utilization 0.44 points. Thus, the relationship is negative. The rather low t- 
statistic indicates that the -4.44 parameter estimate is not very precise. In fact, there is about a 14
14 Andrew Novakovic, Kevin Jack, and Maura Keniston, National and State Trends in Milk Production. 1991. A.E. 
Ext. 91-20, Dept, of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, August 1991.
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15% chance that the real parameter value is z^ro. In either case, the exact value of this relation­
ship is somewhat moot. The extremely low r indicates that changes in the class I differential 
provide only a very poor and unreliable prediction of changes in class I utilization.
As with the price and quantity analysis offered earlier, this analysis illustrates that what may 
seem logical or look reasonable or significant based on a cursory analysis does not necessarily 
hold up under more rigorous analysis. In the specific case of class I differentials and class I 
utilization, we cannot say that the relationship between changes in the two from 1985 to 1988 is 
statistically significant; in fact the relationships we’ve studied are extremely weak.
The Evolution of Class I Differentials
For many years the simple fact that there are differences in class I and blend prices across 
regions, was generally accepted. In the last few years this general acceptance has given way to a 
heated debate about the justification for regional price differences or at least price differences of 
the present magnitude. The purpose of this section is to review how this pricing system evolved. 
We begin with a discussion of price bargaining and cooperative pricing plans prior to federal 
orders and continue with a discussion of the rationale that has guided federal order pricing to this 
day.
Classified Pricing Existed Before Federal Orders
The first classified pricing plan in the U.S., as far as we know, was used in the Boston market 
from about 1880 to 1901.15 *The plan was replaced with what was called a base-rating plan, which 
is a scheme for allocating prices to producers somewhat akin to what we would call a class I base 
plan today. Classified pricing was restored as the dominant pricing system in the Boston market 
from May 1918 to September 1932.;< Cassels states that for the fifteen major Northeastern and 
Midwestern milk markets he studied in the 1930s, in all but one (Minneapolis) “price plans of 
one sort or another have been in effect more or less continuously since the end of the World War 
[I]” (p. 67). Gaumnitz and Reed state that by 1932 some 68 markets operated under a classified 
pricing plan (p. 31).i7 '
Homer explains that in many areas flat pricing was tried before cooperatives moved to 
classified pricing.
Quite naturally the flat price was first used because farmers were not familiar with the conditions 
of the market. It was when distributors began to ask for a lower price because of large amounts 
of surplus that the producers saw the equity of a use price basis (p.24)/a
Metzger provides further insight:
" The historical information in this paragraph is taken from the classic study by John M. Cassels: A Study of Fluid 
Milk Prices. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1937.
"H2id,p.58.
17 E.W. Gaumnitz and O.M. Reed, Some Problems Involved in Establishing Milk Prices. DM-2, Marketing Informa­
tion Series, Agicultural Adjustment Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, September 1937.
“  J.T. Homer, “A Comparative Study of Various Fluid Milk Marketing Plans,” American Cooperation. Vol II, 
1926.
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With the coming of the cooperative association to represent the producers, the 
distributor continued to use the same argument for lower prices that he had used 
for years: That there was so much surplus he could not profitably dispose of the 
milk unless the buying price was low. In many markets it was felt that this was 
often used as an argument to place prices lower than they should be. It was 
proposed that the distributor show the producers exactly the quantity he sold for 
different uses, and that a basis of payment be arranged according to the quanti­
ties of milk sold in each of these classes, (p. 48)'9
Cassels states that, in the beginning, federal law assisted in the development of these pricing 
plans only insofar as they permitted and encouraged collective bargaining by cooperatives.
“The work o f the Federal Food Administration during the War and the passage in 
1922 of the Capper-Volstead Act gave a great impetus to cooperative organiza­
tion among the fluid milk producers of the United States. The growing strength of 
■ these organizations seems to have been largely responsible for the widespread 
adoption during this period of the various price plans here discussed.. Today it is 
unusual to find an important market in this country without a price plan.” (p. 67)
Cassels’ book involves an extensive analysis of dairy markets and competitive conditions, much 
of which still has relevance today. The following summary comments highlight his thoughts on 
how and why classified pricing worked prior to its formalized use in federal orders.
But from the empirical evidence analyzed in the later chapters of the book it has 
been found that, although the assumed conditions of perfect competition are 
closely approximated in the wholesale markets for butter, cheese, and condensed 
milk, the farmers themselves are often much slower than ‘economic men’ should 
be in making the adjustments called for in their disposal responses, and that in 
the marketing of fluid milk in the larger urban markets important elements of 
monopolistic control are commonly present.
The appearance of these monopolistic elements seems to be accounted for, on 
the one hand, by the tempting opportunity presented in a fluid milk market for the 
profitable practice o f discriminative marketing, and, on the other hand, by the 
encouragement given to the farmers during and immediately after the War to 
adopt collective bargaining methods in the selling of their produce. The opportu­
nity for discriminative marketing is particularly favorable because of the inelastic 
character of the Class I  demand and the elastic character o f the Class II 
demand...This fact made it possible for the newly organized bargaining coopera­
tives to obtain substantial price gains for their members during the period from 
1920 to 1932. (pp. 205-206)
The Beginnings of Public Regulation of Milk Prices
Mortenson’s classic book on treating fluid milk distribution as a public utility discusses how 
cooperative bargaining failed in the face of the Great Depression and how this led to further 
thoughts about government intervention.20
" Hutzel Metzger, Cooperative Marketing of Fluid M ilk. Technical Bulletin No. 179, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
" W P . Mortenson, Milk Distribution as a Public Utility. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1940.
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As the severity of the depression increased, large numbers of individuals as well as business 
and industrial concerns began to clamor for public control.... (p.4)
In the fluid milk business regulation involving health and sanitation had been 
common for at least three decades, but it was not until the 1930’s that price 
regulation also made its impression upon the industry. The pressure for this type 
of control came mainly from milk producers but also somewhat from milk dis­
tributors. Legislation by several states and by the federal government brought 
forth a new type of control in the field o f milk production and distribution.
(pp. 4-5)
One o f the main reasons why farm prices of milk for fluid uses remained 
relatively more stable than the prices o f other farm products was due to the 
organization o f producers in fluid-milk markets... A s a general rule, these prices 
were noticeably above those paid for milk used for manufacturing 
purposes....However, in 1931 and 1932, when prices o f manufactured dairy 
products reached the lowest point within a quarter-century, the situation became 
more difficult to control, (pp. 5-6)
Mortenson saw the inability of farmers to bargain effectively for a fair milk price and the first 
state and federal price regulations as only the beginning. He argued that government interven­
tion should extend to treating fluid milk distributors as a public utility.
Although Mortenson was not alone in thinking about the dairy industry as a public utility, a 
more conservative approach better describes what actually occurred. The history in the New 
York milkshed provides an example. Following a decade of on-again off-again successes by the 
fledgling Dairymen’s League in price bargaining with milk handlers, several attempts were made 
to study the situation and recommend state action. This is discussed at some length in the 1984 
article by Novakovic and Boynton:
The essence o f the recommendations o f the Wicks Committee (1917) was that 
government could and should play a more aggressive role in assisting coopera­
tive efforts by providing them with up-to-date information, analyses, and other 
assistance. The Ten Eyck Committee (1927) pressed for greater unity among 
competing cooperatives and saw little role for government beyond facilitating that 
goal. The Pitcher Committee (1933) recommended bolstering o f cooperatives as 
a long-run solution. However, they also suggested direct government intervention 
in the short run....Spencer writes that the Pitcher Committee did not even contem­
plate public price fixing when they began their work in May 1932. It gained 
support as the situation worsened, (p. 772f 1
What eventually evolved in the 1930s was government regulation that was patterned after what 
cooperatives had tried to do on their own but were unable to maintain. Commenting on the 
marketing agreement and licensing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Black 
writes:
These appealed to the milk producers' associations, particularly as they seemed 
to provide that the government would come to the support of their arrangements 
with dealers in the matter of prices, buying plans, and the like, and put an end to
31 Novakovic and Boynton, December 1984, on. c it
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the price cutting and other alleged evils which were said to be 'demoralizing’ the 
milk markets, (p.23)22
Thus, the classified pricing system used in federal orders has its roots in pricing mechanisms 
and procedures developed by cooperatives. This is a simple but very important point to keep in 
mind; because it reveals that classified pricing was not a system devised by bureaucrats and 
theorists but by sellers and buyers in the marketplace for farm milk. Indeed, this is the major 
point of this section of our paper.
The Evolution of a Theory of Classified Pricing
Gaumnitz and Reed in 1937 and Harris in 195823 provide extremely comprehensive reviews 
of the conceptual basis for classified pricing and pooling and the economic effects of classified 
pricing in a geographic marketing area. Both papers were written at a time when classified 
pricing was being questioned. For Gaumnitz and Reed, the issue of the day was whether or not 
the federal government should make classified pricing part of public regulation. As stated 
earlier, federal orders came under fire in the 1950s as a new generation began to question the 
logic of this system.
Neither of these landmark studies directly dealt with the issue of intermarket price alignment, 
which was the largest issue at the hearings. To our knowledge, the first study of that question 
was a USDA study led by Harry Trelogan and Louis Herrmann and published in 1955.2'
For the last 30 years or so it has generally been taken for granted that federal order class I 
prices are aligned across geographic markets east of the Rocky Mountains according to transpor­
tation costs from the Upper Midwest. In discussions today, it seems that many federal order 
analysts and critics believe that the concept of setting class I prices according to a constant 
‘grade A differential’ component and a variable ‘transportation differential’ component was part 
of the original design of federal orders. This is not the case, in fact the whole concept of think­
ing of a class I differential in terms of two component parts is the invention of economic analysts 
who were trying to understand and rationalize a class I price pattern that evolved naturally over a 
period of 20 years or more. -
At their inception in the late 1930s and 1940s, federal orders specified minimum class prices 
according to conditions in local markets. As late as 1950 the still fledgling FMMO system 
consisted of 39 rather small orders whose milk receipts equaled 16% of U.S. production. At this 
time it would have been like the tail wagging the dog to think that federal orders were respon­
sible for aligning prices across the U.S.; however it was deemed very important and logical for 
federal order prices to be aligned with prices for nearby unregulated milk supplies. Like domi­
noes falling one after the other, interregional price relationships evolved. As FMMOs grew in 
size and importance and as marketing technologies advanced to facilitate transporting milk and 
milk products over longer and longer distances, interregional price relationships became more 
important
” John D. Black, The Dairy Industry and the AAA. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1935. 
a Edmund S. Harris, Classified Pricing of Milk—Some Theoretical Aspects. Technical Bulletin No. 1184, Agricul­
tural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, April 1958.
14 Regulations Affecting the Movement and Merchandising of Milk. Marketing Research Report No. 98, Agricul­
tural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1955.
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The landmark 1955 USDA study sheds light on the origin of the current regional pricing 
structure and even speaks to some of the issues being discussed today. As mentioned earlier, 
during the 1953-1954 fiscal year, the federal government purchased the equivalent of over 9% of 
the U.S. milk supply in the form of surplus dairy products. This is a level not much less than the 
worst years of the 1980s. As stated in the report: “The study...was undertaken to supply a need 
for information on regulatory impediments to increased consumption of milk...To expand the 
consumption of fluid milk seemed the best way to reduce [government] stocks and bring satis­
factory returns to producers” (p. iii). (Obviously a similar logic was used in 1985 when the 
National Dairy Board was created by Congress.) The researchers examined sanitary regulations, 
state farm and resale price controls, highway road limits, and federal order provisions.
Many of the issues they identified as impeding the free flow of milk and dairy products, such 
as differences in state sanitary and pricing regulations, have been all but totally eliminated today. 
Many of the federal order provisions they looked at seem more familiar. In evaluating federal 
orders, they focused on provisions that “may be so written as to be unduly restrictive. Among 
the latter are terms establishing the basis on which plants may participate in market-wide pools; 
fixing the rate of compensatory payment on unpooled milk; and fixing the differential in price 
for plants at a distance from market” (p. viii). .
Much of the study was devoted to comparing existing price relationships with a theoretical 
norm. The authors state: “The basis for price analysis was the assumption that, if milk could be 
moved freely, prices could not differ among markets by much more than the cost of transporta­
tion” (p. ix). This rationale eventually came to be accepted as the model for federal order 
pricing across regions. The following excerpts from the study show how researchers approached 
the study and how their assumptions and analysis have become part of what is now taken as the 
accepted design of federal orders:
First came the notion that market prices could be explained by a base point pricing concept.
.. .it would be expected that dealers’ buying prices o f milk for fluid use would be 
related among markets in a logical pattern. A geographic price surface describ­
ing such a pattern would include one or more areas o f lowest prices where more 
milk is produced than consumed. Prices would be expected to increase with 
distance from these areas toward large consuming centers. Even the possibility 
o f moving milk from one market to another would tend to keep prices in line.
Prices would differ among markets by the amount o f transfer costs, o f which the 
largest element is the cost o f transportation.
As a first approximation, it was assumed that dealers’ buying prices would be 
related to prices in the area o f greatest surplus grade A production centering in 
Wisconsin....Eau Claire was selected among several Wisconsin points which 
could have been used with equal validity to represent the area. (p. 88)
Two subtle points should be noted. First, the authors do not state that they used class I price 
data; rather they used a price series that estimated the prices that fluid milk dealers paid for milk. 
This price series no longer exists, but in 1955 it reflected the fact that class I prices were not the 
norm. Thus the study compared regulated and unregulated markets. Second, Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin was not chosen as the point from which all federal order class I prices should be 
based. Rather, existing fluid or class I prices, which had evolved without an overt, administra­
tive design were studied to see if they had a logical geographic relationship to distance from 
Wisconsin. Eau Claire was chosen as one of several possible specific points partly because it
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was a reasonable choice and partly because it was convenient to get pre-measured distances from 
Eau Claire to other locations.
Milk prices paid by dealers for fluid milk from July 1953 to June 1954 were plotted on maps 
to examine the geographic relationships.
Preliminary graphic analysis indicated a relationship between class I prices 
and distances o f markets from a Wisconsin point. Another major region o f low 
prices appeared in Northern New England and Upstate New York, and a third in 
the western United States, beyond the Rocky Mountains.
Thus, visual inspection of the mapped price data revealed that the concept of a single base point 
in Wisconsin was consistent with prices throughout most of the U.S., but the Northeast and West 
didn’t quite fit the pattern.
Prices in all o f the far-western States were substantially below those which 
would be indicated by the price-distance relationship from Wisconsin. Further­
more, the geographic pattern o f dealers’ buying prices in the West was not re­
lated to any single area....Prices in markets west o f the Rockies were excluded 
from the analysis o f prices in relation to distance from Wisconsin, because they 
were far below the level which would be necessary to stimulate imports o f milk for 
the Midwest, (p. 89)
They concluded that Western prices could not be correlated to a Wisconsin base point. They 
could not find evidence of a specific, discrete western base point, but they essentially suggest 
that the pattern of national fluid milk prices is consistent with model having at least a two base 
points.
They came to a somewhat different conclusion about fluid milk prices in the Northeast.
Though prices in Vermont and Upstate New York were unusually low in 
relation to prices indicated by the price-distance relationship analysis, they are 
not prices at which milk is available for movement to other markets with classi­
fied pricing systems. They are the prices at which local dealers can induce 
producers to shift to the local market from pool plants, (pp.89-90)
Supply-demand conditions within the northeastern region might dictate a 
class I price lower than that indicated by relationships with the Midwest. How­
ever, the Northeast has been in a deficit position with respect to fluid milk at times 
in the past decade. The relationship to Midwest prices plus transfer costs is of 
some practical significance, establishing a ceiling which prices in Eastern mar­
kets could not exceed without restrictive regulations, (p. 90)
Thus, Northeastern markets were used in their analysis, but they could see that prices followed a 
different pattern going east of Wisconsin than they did going south.
Having identified the markets they would use in their statistical analysis:
Dealers’ buying prices for fluid milk in 143 markets located east o f the Rocky 
Mountains were related to distance from a Wisconsin point by straightline regres­
sion analysis....The regression o f price on distance indicates a price o f $354 at
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Eau Claire. This [estimate] is one cent less than the average class I  price estab­
lished in the Eau Claire zone by the Chicago order....The analysis shows that 
dealers’ buying price for fluid milk increased an average o f 1.92 cents per hun­
dredweight per 10 miles increase in distance from the Wisconsin point....The 
estimate o f 1.92 cents agrees approximately with information from a limited 
number o f schedules o f rates actually charged by firms specializing in the tanking 
of milk between markets, (p. 90-91)
Thus, researchers hypothesized that class I and blend prices across order areas had evolved 
and were related in a way that could be explained by distance or transportation costs from the 
Upper Midwest The hypothesis tested in the 1950s research proved valid, and transportation 
based pricing from the Upper Midwest has since evolved into the rationale for the geographic 
structure of class I prices, and to some extent blend prices.
Geographic price relationships have been studied more recently by Lasley and by Babb. 
Lasley published several studies, culminating in his 1977 report.2* In this report he states:
In 1975, wholesale [dealers’ buying] prices increased an average of 175 
cents per 100 pounds of milk for fluid use with each 100-mile increase in distance 
from Eau Claire, Wisconsin. This compares with an increase per 100 miles of 
18.2 cents in 1964-65,18.7 cents in 1960-61, 21.8 cents in 1957-58, and 19.2 
cents in 1953-54. This general downtrend has occurred despite recent increases 
in transportation costs.
Fluid milk prices have tended to increase by an almost uniform amount in the 
areas east of the Rockies, so that the general pattern o f differences in milk prices 
has remained very much the same as in previous years, but at a higher price level.
Even so, because of the lower initial price level, the increase in the Upper Mid­
west prices during the past 11 years has been proportionately greater than in the 
more distant markets....Thus, where the price differentials have not kept pace with 
actual transfer costs, milk from the Upper Midwest is more costly than local milk 
for Southern and Eastern buyers....
Although distance from Eau Claire was the dominant factor and explained 
about 77 percent o f the differences in prices, the actual prices paid by dealers do 
deviate from the calculated price line in response to local market conditions.
However, these prices paid by local dealers do not necessarily represent the price 
at which large volumes o f milk would be available for shipment to other markets, 
nor the price at which dealers would be willing to absorb large volumes from 
other markets....
Since the 1964-65 study, several changes have borne directly upon the geo­
graphic alignment o f prices. The most important o f these changes are merger of 
various Federal order markets, discontinuance o f local supply-demand price 
adjusters, and establishment o f a Class I  differential increasing about 15 cents 
per each 100 miles distance from the basing point in Wisconsin, (p.iii)
As we can see, the notion of a single base point in Wisconsin and a constant distance differential 
had become accepted doctrine a generation after these pricing patterns were first discovered.
”  Floyd Lasley, Geographic Structure of Milk Prices. 1975. Agricultural Economic Report No. 387, Economic 
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 1977.
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Even so, Lasley clearly recognized that transportation differentials and single base points only 
explained part of the pattern of regional prices.
Regional Price Patterns Disaggregated
An interesting question was posed during the course of cross-examination in the hearing, to 
wit: do milk price patterns increase equally in all directions from Wisconsin? Using the post- 
FSA class I differentials, we separated federal orders into four groups, each of which appeared to 
have similar distance relationships with respect to Wisconsin. The results are summarized in 
Table 5.
Using data for all federal orders east of the Rockies results in an equation with parameters 
that seem to correspond well to the notion of a gradeA differential (900) and a transportation 
differential (20.50 per 100 miles). However, when this is broken down into regions having 
similar distance relationships; we can see that there are substantial regional differences.
First, the groupings may be somewhat different than anticipated. It would appear that the 
main division is not so much east and south as it is north and south.
Table 5. Interregional Relationships Between Class I Differentials and Distance from Eau Claire
Intercept (Transportation Differential
Pre-FSA (east of Rockies) .86 1.51 .94
Pre-FSA (all orders) 1.21 .94 2.05
Post FS A (east of Rockies) .90 2.05 .88
Post FS A (all orders) 1.51 1.05 .34
Post FSA -
Northern Tier .92 1.88 .95
Southern Tier 1.30 1.84 .91
Pacific -.87 1.59 .94
Southwest . .58 1.16 .83
Second, it may be something of a surprise to see that the values of both of the two compo­
nents of the price relationship change from region to region. The northern and southern tier 
groups have very similar transportation differentials; however class I prices are 30 to 40 cents 
higher in the South due to an apparent difference in the constant component Class I prices in the 
Southwest and Northwest have a somewhat lower transportation differential component and a 
much lower constant. In this case, the transportation differential explains the intraregional price 
alignment more so than any alignment with Wisconsin. The constant component is very low or 
even negative, indicating that prices in the two western regions are well below what one would 
determine on the basis of distance from Wisconsin.
Novakovlc. Pratt - 2 6 - A.E. Res. 91-8
This little exercise reveals that the notion of a grade A differential and a transportation 
differential logic behind class I differentials should not be taken too literally. Prices have not 
evolved identically in all regions, even in the areas strictly east of the Rockies.
The Appropriate Level for Class I Differentials
In asking for testimony on the “appropriate” level of differentials, the Secretary raised a 
thorny issue. How does one identify or define what is or is not appropriate? Ultimately, this 
requires us to think about the economics of dairy markets and the purposes of federal milk 
marketing orders. It is no surprise that different individuals or organizations have different 
viewpoints on these fundamental questions.
We have studied the question of appropriate regional class I price relationships with a math­
ematical model that looks at the pattern of milk production and consumption across the U.S. and 
asks: given transportation and processing costs, milk supplies, and dairy product consumption, 
what would an extra hundred pounds of milk for class I purposes be worth in each area?2*
In one sense this model is quite simple. As implied above, it takes production and consump­
tion as a given and decides where milk should move and be processed so as to satisfy consump­
tion requirements for all dairy products at the minimum marketing cost. In another sense this 
model is quite sophisticated. Unlike other regional models which may contain ten or fewer 
regions, our model represents the U.S. dairy economy as 240 supply locations, 234 demand 
locations, and 436 potential sites for processing any of five product types. This highly disaggre­
gated spatial model permits us to look at relationships across areas that are the size of federal 
order areas and smaller.
As is true of any optimization model, i.e. a model that derives its results by maximizing or 
minimizing some function (e.g. maximizing profit or minimizing cost), it is possible to calculate 
the marginal benefit of adding additional units of some scarce item. In this case we can deter­
mine what the marginal value is of an additional one hundred pounds of milk at any given
location. As we would expect, the model results indicate that the value of an additional one 
hundred pounds of milk for manufacturing does not vary much from one location to the next. 
However, the value of class I milk does vary across locations. The model results on class I 
values do not correspond exactly to federal order class I differentials. More or less, they reflect 
the so-called transportation differential component but do not include a constant grade A differ­
ential component. To create numbers that more closely correspond to the more familiar class I 
differentials, we add a constant to the transportation values taken from the model. The constant 
is chosen so as to result in a price at Minneapolis that is equal to the current Upper Midwest 
Order differential. .
In the next section, we report our estimates of the interregional relationships of these class I 
values under several scenarios. Scenario one is a baseline using 1985 data on production, con­
sumption, and marketing costs. Production and consumption, of course, are different in each 
location. We assume that transportation and processing costs are the same everywhere. Four 
other scenarios are studied to determine the effect of regional changes in production and con­
sumption.
*  James E. Pratt, Andrew M. Novakovic, and Maura M. Keniston, The U.S. Dairy Sector Simulator A Tool for 
Spatial Analysis of the Dairy Industry. AJE. Res., forthcoming. Dept of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, 1990.
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Scenario two uses data from 1970 to recalibrate regional shares of production and con­
sumption. Actual production data are used to calculate regional shares, as shown in Figure 3. 
Population data are used to calculate consumption shares for each region, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. This period is chosen because it is prior to much of the large regional changes in 
production and population. With this scenario we can compare the implicit class I price surface 
relevant to the 1980s with what it would be under 1970 conditions.
□ -53% to -31%
□ -31% to -22%
□ -22% to -16%
B -16% to -10%
■ -10% to -5%
M -5% to 4%
■ 4% to1 27%
■ 27% to 191%
Figure 3. Percent Change in Production Shares from 1970-1985
(The data divisions represent octiles)
Results for scenarios one and two will be different; hence we might ask whether the changes 
in implicit class I values are driven primarily by regional changes in production or by changes in 
population and demand. To answer that question, we construct scenario three, which uses 1970 
regional production shares and 1985 population shares, which in tum determines quantity de­
manded. In this way we can see the impact of changing consumption patterns while holding 
production patterns constant.
Scenario four attempts to represent what production and consumption shares might be in 
2000. We use Bureau of Census forecasts of population shifts to alter the geographic shares of 
consumption, as illustrated by Figure 5. Production trends are extrapolated to obtain new geo­
graphic production shares, as shown in Figure 6. The extrapolations are based on the trend 
analyses and USDA production data reported by Novakovic et al. elsewhere.27
17 Novakovic, Jack, and Keniston, Q£. cit.







-17%  to -13%  
-13%  to -9%  
-9% to -6%  
-6% to -0.%  
-0.%  to 5%  
5% to 10% 
10% to 25%  
25%  to 63%
Figure 4. Percent Change in Population Shares from 1970—1985
data divisions represent octiles)
-11% to 8% 
8% to 23% 
23% to 59%
Figure 5. Percent Change in Production Shares from 1985-2000
(The data divisions represent octiles)
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BIRMINGHAM AL 230 284 240 245
PHOENIX AZ 252 215 279 459
LITTLE ROCK AR 194 261 220 247
FRESNO CA 137 137 234 317
LOS ANGELES CA 177 190 304 389
SAN DIEGO CA 177 208 322 407
SAN FRANCISCO CA 153 177 276 359
REDDING CA 153 179 262 355
DENVER CO 230 204 194 267
GRAND JUNCTION CO 200 145 157 313
MIAMI FL 315 434 297 405
JACKSONVILLE FL 285 380 246 351
TAMPA FL 295 436 302 407
ATLANTA GA 230 298 249 281
BOISE ID 150 120 167 250
CHICAGO IL 126 172 171 164
PEORIA IL 139 185 182 179
INDIANAPOLIS IN 153 199 198 187
DES MOINES IA 140 168 156 160
KANSAS CITY KS 174 188 162 185
LOUISVILLE KY 170 191 183 179
SHREVEPORT LA 247 300 222 282
NEW ORLEANS LA 285 330 242 276
MONROE LA 247 327 257 291
BALTIMORE MD 278 198 220 183
BOSTON MA 300 261 285 243
MARQUETTE MI 135 150 150 150
DETROIT > MI 160 181 187 171
MINNEAPOLIS MN 112 120 120 120
SPRINGFIELD MO 160 177 149 171
OMAHA NE 160 175 150 180
LAS VEGAS NV 160 252 321 396
ALBUQUERQUE NM 235 213 310 385
NEW YORK CITY NY 284 243 272 227
CLEVELAND OH 193 200 209 186
COLUMBUS OH 170 200 209 186
CINCINNATI OH 170 191' 192 180
OKLAHOMA CITY OK 198 229 171 218
PORTLAND OR 195 136 200 296
PITTSBURGH PA 195 191 213 181
PHILADELPHIA PA 278 218 242 203
SIOUX FALLS SD 140 124 120 140
NASHVILLE TN 185 223 214 216
KNOXVILLE TN 210 242 232 226
MEMPHIS TN 194 274 212 235
DALLAS TX 232 291 213 280
EL PASO TX 235 204 251 416
HOUSTON TX 268 358 280 347
LUBBOCK TX 242 232 262 321
AMARILLO TX 225 234 230 279
SALT LAKE CITY UT 190 156 205 279
SEATTLE WA 185 141 194 290
MILWAUKEE WI 117 142 141 136
Novakovtc, Pratt -31  - A.E. Res. 91-8
Notes for Table 6:
Areas in which class I values declined from 1970 to 1985 but would have increased had not 
production increased at a faster rate than consumption:
San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Fresno, Albuquerque, Redding, Las 
Vegas, Phoenix, Portland, Seattle, Salt Lake City, El Paso, Boise, Lubbock,
Grand Junction
Areas in which class I values declined from 1970 to 1985 because of declines in consumption but 
the decline was moderated because production also declined:
New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Cleveland, Colum­
bus, Detroit, Cincinnati
Areas in which class I values were unaffected by either consumption or production changes: 
Minneapolis, Marquette
Areas in which class I values increased but would have decreased due to declines in consumption 
had not production declined even more:
Knoxville, Louisville, Peoria, Indianapolis, Chicago, Milwaukee
Areas in which class I values increased and would have increased more due to increases in 
consumption had there not been some growth in production as well:
Amarillo, Sioux Falls, Denver, Omaha
Areas in which class I values increased due to increases in consumption and increase even more 
due to declining shares of milk production:
Miami, Jacksonville, Tampa, New Orleans, Shreveport, Dallas, Houston, Monroe, 
Memphis, Oklahoma City, Atlanta, Birmingham, Little Rock, Springfield, Kansas 
City, Des Moines, Nashville
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C i t y ________________ State Post-FSA____________ _________________ ' (2000 Cons)
BIRMINGHAM AL 308 284 354 282
PHOENIX AZ 252 215 164 248
LITTLE ROCK AR 277 261 269 260
FRESNO CA 137 137 110 176
LOS ANGELES CA 177 190 142 243
SAN DIEGO CA 177 208 160 261
SAN FRANCISCO CA 153 177 145 217
REDDING CA 153 179 154 206
DENVER CO 273 204 202 208
GRAND JUNCTION CO 200 145 138 174
MIAMI FL 418 434 505 527
JACKSONVILLE FL 358 380 451 399
TAMPA FL 388 436 507 455
ATLANTA GA 308 298 364 307
BOISE ID 150 120 113 145
CHICAGO IL 140 172 172 168
PEORIA IL 161 185 186 182
INDIANAPOLIS IN 200 199 205 191
DES MOINES IA 155 168 186 163
KANSAS CITY KS 192 188 206 187
LOUISVILLE KY 211 191 229 183
SHREVEPORT LA 328 300 297 308
NEW ORLEANS LA 385 330 395 327
MONROE LA 328 327 332 335
BALTIMORE MD 303 198 215 186
BOSTON MA 324 261 267 245
MARQUETTE MI 135 150 150 150
DETROIT MI 175 181 186 169
MINNEAPOLIS MN 120 120 120 120
SPRINGFIELD MO 219 177 187 176
OMAHA NE 175 175 179 175
LAS VEGAS NV 160 252 212 290
ALBUQUERQUE NM 235 213 127 279
NEW YORK CITY NY 314 243 251 227
CLEVELAND OH 195 200 208 186
COLUMBUS OH 204 200 208 186
CINCINNATI OH 211 191 206 184
OKLAHOMA CITY OK 277 229 240 237
PORTLAND OR 195 136 128 151
PITTSBURGH PA 195 191 196 177
PHILADELPHIA PA 303 218 224 203
SIOUX FALLS SD 150 124 128 124
NASHVILLE TN 252 223 289 232
KNOXVILLE TN 277 242 292 246
MEMPHIS TN 277 274 289 272
DALLAS TX 328 291 276 302
EL PASO TX 235 204 177 220
HOUSTON TX 382 358 343 369
LUBBOCK TX 249 232 192 240
AMARILLO TX 249 234 194 242
SALT LAKE CITY UT 190 156 149 179
SEATTLE WA 185 141 127 148
MILWAUKEE WI 131 142 143 139
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Notes for Table 7:
**’ denotes that this location is in a different group than it was for the 1985 to 1970 comparisons.
Areas in which class I values declined from 1985 to 2000 but would have increased had not 
production increased at a faster rate than consumption:
Albuquerque, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Diego, Las Vegas, Amarillo*, Lubbock,
San Francisco, Fresno, El Paso, Redding, Dallas*, Houston*, Seattle, Portland,
Grand Junction, Boise, Salt Lake City, Shreveport*
Areas in which class I values declined from 1985 to 2000 because of declines in consumption but 
the decline was moderated because production also declined:
none
Areas in which class I values increased but would have decreased due to declines in consumption 
had not production declined even more:
Birmingham*, New Orleans*, Louisville, Des Moines*, Kansas City*, Balti­
more*, Cincinnati*, Memphis*, Springfield*, New York City*, Columbus*,
Cleveland*, Little Rock*, Boston*, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh*,
Detroit*, Milwaukee, Peoria, Chicago,
Areas in which class I values increased and would have increased more due to increases in 
consumption had there not been some growth in production as well:
Denver, Monroe*, Miami*
Areas in which class I values increased due to increases in consumption and increase even more 
due to declining shares of milk production:
Tampa, Jacksonville, Nashville, Atlanta, Knoxville*, Oklahoma City
Areas in which class I values were unaffected by consumption changes and increased entirely 
due to declining shares of milk production:
Minneapolis*, Marquette*, Sioux Falls*, Omaha*
Novakovlc. Pratt - 3 4 - A.E. Res. 91-8
Thus, these result indicate that the general pattern of current class I milk prices makes some 
sense, given existing production and consumption patterns. Changing production and/or con­
sumption patterns will result in different class I values. Increasing consumption or decreasing 
production will result in higher class I values. Changes in transportation or processing costs 
would also affect class I values. We have not attempted to evaluate the latter, but we have 
studied the effects of changing regional patterns of production and consumption. The generally 
small changes that might occur from one year to the next do not substantially alter class I values. 
Hence, we have focused on the kinds of value changes that result from longer term changes in 
production and consumption.
Results for scenarios 2 and 3, in which historical changes since 1970 are evaluated, are 
shown in Table 6. Calculated class I values for the 1970 data (Scenario 2) are also illustrated in 
Figure 8. Areas in the West and Northeast and Mideast had declining class I values from 1970 to 
1985; however the reasons for the declines were starkly different from one coast to the other. In 
the West the decline was due to production growing faster than consumption. In the East the 
decline was due to consumption falling off even as production was falling off at a slower rate.
Class I values increased from 1970 to 1985 everywhere else, but again the reasons were 
different for three distinct situations. In the Upper Midwest and an area just to the south in 
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky declines in consumption would have led to lower differentials, 
but even greater declines in production pushed differentials in the other direction. In all of these 
areas the differences either way were very small.
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In a broad area of the Plains states, stretching from Sioux Falls to Amarillo, class I values 
would have increased even more due to consumption increases had there not been an offsetting 
increase in production.
A large group of mostly southern locations had increased class I values coming from both 
increases in consumption and decreasing relative shares of production.
Results for scenarios four and five are shown in Table 7. Class I values given our projections 
for 2000 (Scenario 4) are shown in Figure 9. In this case, we try to illustrate the direction that 
regional class I value may take, if our projections of changes in the regional shares of production 
and consumption are reasonably accurate. Generally speaking, these results suggest that class I 
values will decline rather substantially in Western markets as production growth exceeds con­
sumption growth. Slowly shrinking supplies in the Midwest and Northeast result in modest 
increases in class I values. A small number of markets primarily in the Southeast are associated 
with higher class I values brought about primarily by consumption growing faster than produc­
tion.
The Importance of Pooling Criteria
The class I values shown above refer strictly to what we would call the value of class I milk. 
Left unanswered is the important question of how one values producer milk, i.e. what are the 
rules for pooling the higher class I values over a broader range of producers than just those
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directly shipping to class I handlers. In our opinion, pool qualification criteria and pooling 
provisions deserve much more studious attention than they have been given. In many respects 
the regional concerns that have been manifested at the 1990 hearing reflect different positions 
with respect to how class I differentials are or should be pooled. While we are convinced that 
pooling provisions should be an important part of the discussions that are presently taking place, 
we are doubtful that enough research has been done to understand all the ramifications of current 
or alternative provisions; consequently we are not adequately prepared to make appropriate 
decisions with respect to changes in pooling provisions.
Novakovlc, Pratt - 3 7 - A.E. Res. 91-8
Bibliography
1 R.D. Boynton and A.M. Novakovic, The Impact of the Milk Diversion Program on U.S. Milk 
Production. A.E. Ext.84-4, Dept, of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, March 1984, pp. 15-16.
2 Andrew M. Novakovic and Maura Keniston, Regional Differences in the Dairy Industry and 
Their Use in Evaluating Dairy Surpluses. A.E. Ext. 89-3, Dept, of Agr. Econ., Cornell Uni­
versity, January 1989.
3 Irving Dubov and M. Lloyd Downen, “The Midwest-Eastern Seaboard Conflict of Interest in 
the Production and Distribution of Milk: The Role of Market Structures and Other Institu­
tional Arrangements,” Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 42, no. 5, December 1960, pp. 1313­
1327.
4 Linley E. Juers, “Discussion: The Role of Market Structures and Other Institutional Ar­
rangements,” Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 42, no. 5, December 1960, pp. 1327-1331.
5 Andrew Novakovic, “Alternatives to the M-W Price as the Basis for Setting Prices Under 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders,” Leaflet 25, Dairy Policy Issues and Options for the 1990 
Farm Bill, Dept, of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, 1990.
6 Andrew M. Novakovic and Robert D. Boynton, “Do Changes in Farmer-First Handler Ex­
change Eliminate the Need for Government Intervention,” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. Vol. 66, no. 5, December 1984, pp. 769-775.
7 “Study of the Chicago Regional Mailbox Price (Zone 4 and Zone 16) Compared to Other 
Federal Orders” Reporter, the monthly publication of the Market Administrator’s Office for 
the Chicago Regional and Indiana Marketing Areas: “Part One,” September 1988, pp. 5-8; 
“Part Two,” October 1988, pp. 5-7; “Parts Three and Four,” December 1988, pp. 5-12; “Part 
Five,” January 1989, pp. 7-10; and February 1989, pp. 5-8.
8 Novakovic, Andrew, Kevin Jack, and Maura Keniston. National and State Trends in Milk 
Production. 1991. A.E. Ext. 91-20, Dept of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, August 1991.
9 Cassels, John M. A Study of Fluid Milk Prices. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
1937. '
10 Gaumnitz, E.W. and O.M. Reed. Some Problems Involved in Establishing Milk Prices. 
DM-2, Marketing Information Series, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture, September 1937.
11 Homer, J.T. “A Comparative Study of Various Fluid Milk Marketing Plans,” American 
Cooperation. Vol II, 1926.
12 Metzger, Hutzel. Cooperative Marketing of Fluid Milk. Technical Bulletin No. 179. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.
13 Mortenson, W.P. Milk Distribution as a Public Utility. Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1940.
Novakovic, Pratt A.E. Res. 91-8
14 Black, John D. The Dairy Industry and the AAA. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1935.
15 Harris, Edmund S. Classified Pricing of Milk—Some Theoretical Aspects. Technical Bulle­
tin No. 1184, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, April 1958.
16 U.S. Department of Agriculture. Regulations Affecting the Movement and Merchandising of 
Milk. Marketing Research Report No. 98, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, June 1955.
17 Lasley, Floyd. Geographic Structure of Milk Prices. 1975. Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 387, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 1977.
18 Pratt, James E., Andrew M. Novakovic, and Maura M. Keniston. The U.S. Dairy Sector 
Simulator: A Tool for Spatial Analysis of the Dairy Industry. A.E. Res., forthcoming, Dept, 
of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, 1990.
Novakovic, Pratt -  39  - A.E. Res. 91-8
